Why Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons — and what that means in an invasion by Russia
…
Three decades ago, the newly independent country of Ukraine was briefly the third-largest nuclear power in the world.
Thousands of nuclear arms had been left on Ukrainian soil by Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But in the years that followed, Ukraine made the decision to completely denuclearize.
In exchange, the U.S., the U.K. and Russia would guarantee Ukraine’s security in a 1994 agreement known as the Budapest Memorandum.
….
But they were told at the time that the United States and Western powers — so certainly at least the United States and Great Britain — take their political commitments really seriously. This is a document signed at the highest level by the heads of state. So the implication was Ukraine would not be left to stand alone and face a threat should it come under one.
This from DPot on a public listserv is a bit long but the argument is worth reading. The summary is that there are many steps left before nuclear war if the West approves long range missile use against Moscow. No one knows for absolute, however, this is just a good argument for that probably being the case:
The argument put forth by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Donald Trump Jr. in the article from The Hill urges de-escalation of U.S. involvement in Ukraine and warns of the risks of nuclear conflict. While their concerns about nuclear warfare are valid, the broader narrative they promote contains numerous oversimplifications, misconceptions, and misrepresentations of both the conflict and the role of U.S. foreign policy.
The article argues that allowing Ukraine to use NATO-provided long-range missiles against Russia would escalate the conflict to the brink of nuclear war. While nuclear risks should never be dismissed, it’s important to note that Ukraine has already been conducting attacks on Russian military infrastructure, including in Crimea and Russian territory, with existing Western-provided weaponry, such as HIMARS and drones, without provoking direct nuclear escalation from Russia.
Nuclear deterrence theory suggests that nuclear powers, including Russia, are rational actors who avoid using nuclear weapons due to the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD). While Russia has repeatedly made nuclear threats, its nuclear doctrine does not support first use unless the existence of the Russian state is under direct threat. The West’s provision of long-range precision weapons is intended to bolster Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, not to initiate offensive strikes deep into Russia that would provoke an existential threat to the Russian state.
Additionally, Russia’s previous restraint does not necessarily indicate that its nuclear threats are imminent; rather, it reflects the balance of power and strategic calculations. As experts have noted, Putin uses nuclear rhetoric to intimidate the West and discourage further support for Ukraine, but there is no direct evidence suggesting that limited military support has brought the world closer to nuclear war.
Kennedy and Trump argue that Russia would interpret deep strikes as acts of war, but this perspective misrepresents Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Russia’s policy emphasizes nuclear use only in the case of existential threats, which Ukraine’s defense, even with long-range weapons, does not represent. Moreover, Russia has a long history of using nuclear threats as political leverage to dissuade adversaries from opposing its aggression, but it has never acted on those threats during conventional conflicts.
The article suggests that the West is engaged in a reckless game of “nuclear chicken,” yet maintaining credible deterrence is vital to preventing nuclear conflict. History shows that weak responses to aggression can embolden authoritarian regimes, as occurred in the 1930s with Nazi Germany. Appeasement has historically led to greater instability and larger conflicts. Ensuring Ukraine’s ability to defend itself is a key measure in preventing a wider war, rather than a reckless gamble.
The assertion that “there is no remaining step between firing U.S. missiles deep into Russian territory and a nuclear exchange” is a dangerous oversimplification. There are numerous diplomatic and strategic steps that remain between conventional military action and nuclear escalation. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in multiple proxy wars (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan) without nuclear weapons being used. The current U.S. strategy of providing Ukraine with defensive aid mirrors this historical approach: helping an ally resist aggression without directly confronting a nuclear adversary.
Moreover, Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons would be counterproductive even from its own perspective. A nuclear strike would alienate Russia internationally, potentially leading to crippling sanctions and military responses from NATO countries, further isolating Russia and damaging its own security interests. The current U.S. policy aims to contain the conflict within Ukraine while minimizing direct confrontation with Russia.
Kennedy and Trump claim that no vital American interest is at stake in Ukraine. However, this view ignores the broader geopolitical stakes involved. Ukraine’s sovereignty is crucial to the stability of Europe, and if Russia is allowed to succeed in its territorial ambitions, it would set a precedent that territorial conquest is acceptable in the 21st century. This would encourage further aggressive actions from other authoritarian regimes, such as China regarding Taiwan, threatening global stability and security.
Additionally, NATO’s security is directly linked to the defense of Ukraine. A destabilized Ukraine could have serious consequences for NATO’s eastern flank, increasing the risk of conflict spilling over into NATO member states like Poland and the Baltic countries. The U.S. has a vested interest in maintaining a rules-based international order, and abandoning Ukraine would erode global trust in U.S. commitments to its allies.
The article asserts that Russia’s war aims were limited to ensuring Ukrainian neutrality and stopping NATO’s eastward expansion. However, Russia’s actions throughout the conflict suggest far broader objectives. Putin’s regime has frequently referenced the goal of restoring Russian imperial influence and denying Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state. Far from simply opposing NATO, Russia seeks to dominate Ukraine and possibly other former Soviet states, as seen in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014.
If Ukraine were forced into neutrality or territorial concessions, it would not guarantee peace; instead, it would embolden Putin to further expand Russian influence through aggression, threatening more of Eastern Europe. This would ultimately require a larger, more costly military response from the West in the future.
Kennedy and Trump highlight the catastrophic potential of nuclear war, which is an important concern. However, preventing nuclear conflict involves a balance of deterrence and diplomacy, not unilateral de-escalation or concessions. The U.S. and its allies must continue to support Ukraine’s right to self-defense while carefully managing escalation risks.
Diplomacy is critical, but negotiating from a position of strength ensures that aggressors like Russia do not succeed in their territorial ambitions, which would destabilize the global order. Diplomatic off-ramps can only succeed if Russia perceives that its aggression will not be rewarded. Concessions now would likely lead to future conflicts, as Russia or other authoritarian regimes would feel emboldened to pursue their goals through force.
While Kennedy and Trump raise valid concerns about nuclear risk, their argument misrepresents the nature of Russia’s threats, U.S. foreign policy, and the stakes in Ukraine.
Public Post by MJens on a listserv:
Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons and what that means in a Russian invasion : NPR
https://www.npr.org/2022/02/21/1082124528/ukraine-russia-putin-invasion
Why Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons — and what that means in an invasion by Russia
…
Three decades ago, the newly independent country of Ukraine was briefly the third-largest nuclear power in the world.
Thousands of nuclear arms had been left on Ukrainian soil by Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But in the years that followed, Ukraine made the decision to completely denuclearize.
In exchange, the U.S., the U.K. and Russia would guarantee Ukraine’s security in a 1994 agreement known as the Budapest Memorandum.
….
But they were told at the time that the United States and Western powers — so certainly at least the United States and Great Britain — take their political commitments really seriously. This is a document signed at the highest level by the heads of state. So the implication was Ukraine would not be left to stand alone and face a threat should it come under one.
This from DPot on a public listserv is a bit long but the argument is worth reading. The summary is that there are many steps left before nuclear war if the West approves long range missile use against Moscow. No one knows for absolute, however, this is just a good argument for that probably being the case:
The argument put forth by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Donald Trump Jr. in the article from The Hill urges de-escalation of U.S. involvement in Ukraine and warns of the risks of nuclear conflict. While their concerns about nuclear warfare are valid, the broader narrative they promote contains numerous oversimplifications, misconceptions, and misrepresentations of both the conflict and the role of U.S. foreign policy.
The article argues that allowing Ukraine to use NATO-provided long-range missiles against Russia would escalate the conflict to the brink of nuclear war. While nuclear risks should never be dismissed, it’s important to note that Ukraine has already been conducting attacks on Russian military infrastructure, including in Crimea and Russian territory, with existing Western-provided weaponry, such as HIMARS and drones, without provoking direct nuclear escalation from Russia.
Nuclear deterrence theory suggests that nuclear powers, including Russia, are rational actors who avoid using nuclear weapons due to the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD). While Russia has repeatedly made nuclear threats, its nuclear doctrine does not support first use unless the existence of the Russian state is under direct threat. The West’s provision of long-range precision weapons is intended to bolster Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, not to initiate offensive strikes deep into Russia that would provoke an existential threat to the Russian state.
Additionally, Russia’s previous restraint does not necessarily indicate that its nuclear threats are imminent; rather, it reflects the balance of power and strategic calculations. As experts have noted, Putin uses nuclear rhetoric to intimidate the West and discourage further support for Ukraine, but there is no direct evidence suggesting that limited military support has brought the world closer to nuclear war.
Kennedy and Trump argue that Russia would interpret deep strikes as acts of war, but this perspective misrepresents Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Russia’s policy emphasizes nuclear use only in the case of existential threats, which Ukraine’s defense, even with long-range weapons, does not represent. Moreover, Russia has a long history of using nuclear threats as political leverage to dissuade adversaries from opposing its aggression, but it has never acted on those threats during conventional conflicts.
The article suggests that the West is engaged in a reckless game of “nuclear chicken,” yet maintaining credible deterrence is vital to preventing nuclear conflict. History shows that weak responses to aggression can embolden authoritarian regimes, as occurred in the 1930s with Nazi Germany. Appeasement has historically led to greater instability and larger conflicts. Ensuring Ukraine’s ability to defend itself is a key measure in preventing a wider war, rather than a reckless gamble.
The assertion that “there is no remaining step between firing U.S. missiles deep into Russian territory and a nuclear exchange” is a dangerous oversimplification. There are numerous diplomatic and strategic steps that remain between conventional military action and nuclear escalation. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in multiple proxy wars (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan) without nuclear weapons being used. The current U.S. strategy of providing Ukraine with defensive aid mirrors this historical approach: helping an ally resist aggression without directly confronting a nuclear adversary.
Moreover, Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons would be counterproductive even from its own perspective. A nuclear strike would alienate Russia internationally, potentially leading to crippling sanctions and military responses from NATO countries, further isolating Russia and damaging its own security interests. The current U.S. policy aims to contain the conflict within Ukraine while minimizing direct confrontation with Russia.
Kennedy and Trump claim that no vital American interest is at stake in Ukraine. However, this view ignores the broader geopolitical stakes involved. Ukraine’s sovereignty is crucial to the stability of Europe, and if Russia is allowed to succeed in its territorial ambitions, it would set a precedent that territorial conquest is acceptable in the 21st century. This would encourage further aggressive actions from other authoritarian regimes, such as China regarding Taiwan, threatening global stability and security.
Additionally, NATO’s security is directly linked to the defense of Ukraine. A destabilized Ukraine could have serious consequences for NATO’s eastern flank, increasing the risk of conflict spilling over into NATO member states like Poland and the Baltic countries. The U.S. has a vested interest in maintaining a rules-based international order, and abandoning Ukraine would erode global trust in U.S. commitments to its allies.
The article asserts that Russia’s war aims were limited to ensuring Ukrainian neutrality and stopping NATO’s eastward expansion. However, Russia’s actions throughout the conflict suggest far broader objectives. Putin’s regime has frequently referenced the goal of restoring Russian imperial influence and denying Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state. Far from simply opposing NATO, Russia seeks to dominate Ukraine and possibly other former Soviet states, as seen in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014.
If Ukraine were forced into neutrality or territorial concessions, it would not guarantee peace; instead, it would embolden Putin to further expand Russian influence through aggression, threatening more of Eastern Europe. This would ultimately require a larger, more costly military response from the West in the future.
Kennedy and Trump highlight the catastrophic potential of nuclear war, which is an important concern. However, preventing nuclear conflict involves a balance of deterrence and diplomacy, not unilateral de-escalation or concessions. The U.S. and its allies must continue to support Ukraine’s right to self-defense while carefully managing escalation risks.
Diplomacy is critical, but negotiating from a position of strength ensures that aggressors like Russia do not succeed in their territorial ambitions, which would destabilize the global order. Diplomatic off-ramps can only succeed if Russia perceives that its aggression will not be rewarded. Concessions now would likely lead to future conflicts, as Russia or other authoritarian regimes would feel emboldened to pursue their goals through force.
While Kennedy and Trump raise valid concerns about nuclear risk, their argument misrepresents the nature of Russia’s threats, U.S. foreign policy, and the stakes in Ukraine.